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I.
Rebecca Schuman’s study of Kafka’s novels and stories adapts a “dissolution”-style argu-
ment from Wittgenstein’s work on philosophical problems and applies it to the inter-
pretive problems confronting Kafka’s readers. Each of its six main chapters is framed 
as an intervention in a crowded field of interpretations given by Germanists and other 
scholars of literary modernism, all of which speak in some way or other to persistent 
basic problems of interpretation, such as whether Josef K., the protagonist of The Trial, 
is guilty or not, or what the meaning of the officer’s death in his own torture machine is 
in the story “In the Penal Colony.” Schuman depicts questions such as these as illusory, 
and implies that all the rival interpretations which even attempt to answer them are es-
sentially misbegotten. Although her business is mostly interpretive, on literary terrain, 
she conducts it primarily in an academic (as opposed to what I think of as a literary-
critical) mode, which is reflected in the style of interpretive arguments she makes, call-
ing on the powerful machinery of an authoritative external discourse, a “theory,” to sup-
port her conclusions. The wrinkle is that Schuman enlists the notoriously anti-theory 
Wittgenstein as her theorist. She calls the resulting account “analytic modernism,” a 
type of literary modernism informed by analytic philosophy which is to vie with Marx-
ist, psychoanalytic, or deconstructionist accounts of modernism.
Most of the book is given over to making Schuman’s case for analytic modernism on 
practical critical grounds, i.e., showing that her approach bears fruit on a work-by-work 
basis. The book falls into two parts scaffolded by a more or less conventional “early” and 
“late” Wittgenstein, with each chapter pairing a literary work with selected philosophi-
cal ideas. In Part One, relying on the Tractatus, she pairs The Trial with an application 
of the distinction between sense, nonsense, and senselessness in order to address the 
question of whether Josef K. is guilty or not (chapter 1); The Metamorphosis with the 
saying/showing distinction in order to address the question of what the metaphor of 
Gregor Samsa’s bug body means (chapter 2); and “The Judgment” with the ineffability 
of the ethical in order to address the question of why Georg Bendemann leaps so pre-
cipitously to his death in apparent obedience to the titular verdict of his father (chapter 
3). In Part Two, switching to the Investigations, Schuman pairs The Castle with ostensive 
definition in order to address the question of whether the protagonist K. is the genuine 
land surveyor he is taken to be by the occupants of the village governed by the nearby 
castle (chapter 4); “In the Penal Colony” with rule-following in order to address the 
question of the meaning of the apparently abrupt malfunction of the torture machine 
which kills its greatest advocate, the officer who had spent most of the story’s duration 
explaining the machine’s operation to a visiting observer to the penal colony (chapter 
5); and “Josefine the Singer” with private language in order to address the question of 
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whether Josefine’s singing is genuinely understood by her people, or is even singing at 
all (chapter 6).
II.
Schuman’s claims to have made a case for analytic modernism will be a source of con-
sternation for interested readers. Her account is undermined by her failure to provide 
a definite statement of the position she wishes to defend, a defect that can be attributed 
substantially to needless obscurity in the book’s organization and its exposition of its 
more programmatic business, but also to Schuman’s tendency throughout to interrupt 
her own argument to offer previews, deferrals, and promissory notes, which has the ef-
fect of burdening the readers with uncertainty as to when they will be entitled to regard 
Schuman as having given a stable statement of her views. There is also a stylistic problem 
with the calibration of the magnitude of her assertions; she seems overly fond of super-
latives dropped into sentences so as to promote them to the level of devastating claims.
Much of what Schuman does have to say specifically about analytic modernism as the 
type of literary modernism for which she argues occurs, somewhere, in the book’s scaf-
folding. In addition to the six chapters already mentioned, the book includes an intro-
duction, a long preface to Part One, a short preface to Part Two, and a set of concluding 
remarks (not to mention endnotes in which some material pertinent to this matter is 
marooned). The basic obstacle is that across this structure, Schuman specifies an analytic 
modernism—discussed principally in the introduction—that cleaves into two varieties 
of literary modernism which she calls “logical modernism” and “analytic skepticism.” It’s 
clear that she associates the former with the Tractatus and the latter with the Investiga-
tions, and thus that she counts the corresponding literary works of the first and second 
parts of the book (also subtitled accordingly) as exemplifying the respective varieties of 
modernism. What only becomes evident after much more probing on the part of a read-
er looking for more clarity is that she does not attach much definite additional meaning 
to any specifically literary sense of her names for her three literary modernisms. She calls 
logical modernism “logical modernism” because she uses the Tractatus to characterize 
it, and that phrase characterizes the Tractatus for her (p. 12, p. 37; cf. p. 198n12), with 
the emphasis on “logic.” Likewise with “analytic skepticism” and the Investigations (p. 12, 
p. 110), emphasis on “skepticism.” (A further complication is that both of these mod-
ernisms partake of the “language skepticism” or “linguistic skepticism” which Schuman 
submits was shared by Wittgenstein, Kafka, and others of their Austrian milieu, per pp. 
22-31. But this forms more of the atmosphere of the book as a whole, and is rarely in-
voked with much specificity.)
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The wish for more definite statements of what “logical modernism” and “analytic skepti-
cism” consist in, as varieties of literary modernism, stems not from a mania for rigorous 
definitions (nice as those can be), but from questions that are provoked naturally by 
Schuman’s interpretive arguments in the individual chapters. The essential dependency 
of her account of these modernisms on two distinct phases of Wittgenstein’s thought 
suggests one question, in particular, that is illuminating to consider even if it was not 
necessarily incumbent upon her to do so. Given that the default suggestion, inherited 
from a received understanding of Wittgenstein’s development, would be that some form 
of development is to be expected between logical modernism and analytic skepticism as 
varieties of literary modernism, does Schuman’s account tend to encourage or discourage 
the thought of such a development?
Just on the literary level, Schuman gestures toward, without insisting upon, a develop-
mental perspective on Kafka’s works that aligns fortuitously with the early/late scheme 
of Wittgenstein’s development. But in summary, at least, she is emphatic that her results 
take the same, conclusive form no matter the period of Wittgenstein’s work used to sup-
port them: “Six works, six questions, six ways that Wittgenstein has helped us to see that 
they cannot actually be asked” (p. 194). We might grant that the dogmatic tone here, 
redolent of the early Wittgenstein, could suit those of her results that are supported by 
the Tractatus (she mentions “resolute” readings but prefers to invoke a traditional one). 
But given the fashion for undogmatic readings of the Investigations in particular, phi-
losophers will wonder how Schuman could render all six of her results with “cannots” in 
equally absolute terms. That she in fact embraces a fairly dogmatic-sounding “Pyrrho-
nian view” for her later Wittgenstein (p. 160, p. 11) does not really settle the question, 
either, since this only calls attention to the interpretive arguments she actually makes in 
the individual chapters with the help of sometimes later and sometimes earlier Wittgen-
steins, with (as she emphasizes, p. 194 again) nevertheless convergent conclusions as to 
the illusory nature of the problems of Kafka interpretation. Are they all supposed to be 
equally convincing despite the shift in their source of support? And if the shift matters, 
how does it reflect on the arguments of the earlier chapters?
III.
These are not necessarily questions which will seem to arise on a chapter-by-chapter 
level, where the pattern of Schuman’s interpretive arguments is anchored in her percep-
tion of the texts that she reads. This pattern is sketched most nicely in the first few pages 
of the introduction (pp. 3–7), where she exemplifies the Kafkaesque with a reading of 
Kafka’s “Little Fable” (the one about the existentially mis-oriented mouse corrected and 
then promptly eaten by a cat). She identifies in it a double-twisting plot structure which 
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reappears in many of Kafka’s works, in which a character first realizes that he or she 
(or it!) has been under some illusion, only to realize that the initial illusion had been 
covering up some larger and more important one behind which stands the character’s 
real problem. Schuman claims that this pattern has an implication for interpreters of 
Kafka, as well:
As Kafka critics, we are often and understandably under the impression that 
in the course of our critical exploration, we are going to find out what his 
works mean. The approach I advocate in this book argues instead that in this 
search we are sorely mistaken. Instead, the problems and illusions we pretend 
to uncover, the important questions we attempt to answer—Is Josef K. guilty? 
If so, of what? What does Gregor Samsa’s transformed body mean? Is Land 
Surveyor K. a real land surveyor or not?—themselves presuppose a bigger 
delusion: that such questions can be asked in the first place. (p. 5)
The double twist is effected swiftly in the “Little Fable,” simply by means of the narra-
tor’s last bit of work: to recount what the cat says and does to the mouse. “‘You’ve sim-
ply got to run in the other direction,’ said the cat, and ate it.” After three sentences from 
the mouse recounting his perception of his shrinking world and impending doom, 
that is all it takes to make the reader see the mouse’s fate according to the illusion-
covering-an-illusion structure Schuman describes.
The patterning of Schuman’s invocations of Wittgestein for more complex tales also 
follows this illusion-covering-an-illusion structure. So, for example, she identifies a 
story element, like the narrator’s remark near the beginning of “Josefine the Singer” 
that “anyone who has not heard her does not know the power of song” (quoted on 
p. 184). She invokes an idea of Wittgenstein’s and argues for its applicability to the 
element, for instance the idea that “our misunderstanding of the nature of our lan-
guage” makes us “mistake a grammatical remark for a material one” (p. 188), used 
to support the claim that the narrator’s remark about Josefine only apparently attests 
to the value of her art—thus uncovering a first illusion. And eventually, she reasons 
toward a second, larger illusion, typically by invoking in a literary register the major 
(negative) consequences which she associates with the relevant philosophical work of 
Wittgenstein’s; in the present example, toward the illusion that there could even have 
been a question: “viewed as a Pyrrhonian work [the story] does something quite dif-
ferent [than leaving unsolved the question of the nature and value of Josefine’s perfor-
mances,] and quite remarkable: it leaves dissolved the question of the nature and value 
of Josefine’s singing” (p. 189).
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The shape of this pattern inclines Schuman toward using the most potent Wittgenstei-
nian ideas in featured roles in her interpretations, presumably just because these would 
facilitate the tidiest and most conclusive-sounding dissolutions of the questions she de-
picts as illusory. For instance, she denies the possibility of a private language on the basis 
of remarks about the grammar of the word “know” (cf. Investigations §246), i.e., unmasks 
the thought of a private language as illusory (pp. 178-182), and then denies that issuing 
reminders about obvious grammatical remarks constitutes any kind of advancement of a 
philosophical thesis, i.e., any hint of philosophical progress (p. 183).
But this means that much turns on the applicability of the Wittgensteinian ideas to the 
literary elements to which they must apply. In the case of the narrator’s remark about not 
knowing the power of song that I quoted above—perhaps the linchpin, though not the 
core, of Schuman’s argument in the chapter it belongs to—it seems questionable whether 
this should be spoken of as a “grammatical remark,” as she does; in context, her implau-
sible reasons for insisting upon it seem to force her to deny the obvious truth, that the 
narrator who makes the remark means, as anyone saying those words would have to, that 
Josefine’s song is powerful (attesting that this is materially so).
IV.
Other doubts about applicability arise elsewhere, such as in the fifth chapter, where 
Schuman seems to secure it at the cost of leaving a lot of relevant evidence unaccounted 
for. The interpretation of Kafka centers on an application of Wittgenstein’s rule-following 
considerations from the Investigations to the events of “In the Penal Colony.” Schuman 
wishes to argue, among other things, that no kind of ironic reading of the machine’s mal-
function is possible, because this would presuppose that the machine had ever worked 
successfully prior to the time of the explorer’s visit to the penal colony. Schuman denies 
this, partly on the basis of details of the story, which is designed not to show a success-
ful execution and renders what the officer says about the executions doubtful from the 
explorer’s perspective; and partly on the strength of her reading of the rule-following 
considerations, which she seems to take—the twists in her reasoning become hard to 
follow—to confirm the impossibility of legitimately proving or validating anything about 
the machine or the officer’s rules for it. Her own interpretation maintains that the offi-
cer’s suicide is “uninterpretable” (p. 160).
But despite what he may not know about the past use of the machine, the explorer surely 
knows that the officer believes, among other things, that by design the condemned do 
not know their punishments. At least not, that is, until they supposedly come to un-
derstand these, bodily, halfway through the torturous process of execution, as the pun-
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ishments are scrawled, as inscriptions of the commandments violated, on their skins. 
By selecting his own punishment in response to the explorer’s refusal to give a sign of 
support for him to the others in the colony, the officer is evidently breaking with proto-
col—in the very same act with which he seeks to punish himself, as it were to serve both 
as justice’s agent and its patient. What could this mean? Is the explorer, or are we, obvi-
ously mistaken to think that there is a sensible question of how the officer’s action is to 
be interpreted, even if we grant that the officer might not have ever actually carried out 
a successful execution, or any at all? I don’t pretend to know, and I would hardly deny 
that the rule-following considerations may remain just as relevant to addressing these 
questions as to the ones Schuman is inclined to address in order to reinforce her case for 
analytic modernism. But it seems that pertinent questions about the story cannot be so 
easily dismissed as illusory.
V.
In Schuman’s first chapter, which applies ideas from the Tractatus to The Trial, there 
seems to me to be a larger unresolved question about the applicability of the ideas. There 
are also serious issues with her reasoning about them. Schuman begins, as elsewhere, by 
recalling a long-standing question of interpretation about Kafka’s work. Here, the ques-
tion is: “is protagonist Josef K. guilty despite never having a formal charge leveled against 
him?” (p. 39). The interpretive difficulty stems from the fact that the reasons for K.’s ar-
rest and trial are never made clear, to him or to the reader; all he ever learns about the 
extraordinarily odd trial and the inscrutable court from the others he encounters during 
the course of the novel is, seemingly, contradictory. Yet in the end he is taken away and 
killed. Schuman’s proposed interpretation is:
K.’s chargeless arrest, quest for tautological innocence, contradiction-filled trial, 
and perplexingly expected death actually comprise a progression that is, at least 
according to one law—that of formal logic—wholly valid. (p. 41)
She is emphatic about treating that validity in logical terms. The case for this interpreta-
tion depends largely upon Schuman’s identification of a number of “contradictions” in 
the world of the story, noticed by K. or even called contradictory by him. The trick of the 
interpretation is the identification of these “contradictory” story elements with tractar-
ian contradictions, which then lack sense rather than being nonsensical; have no truth 
conditions; and could be said to belong to the symbolism of logic, reflecting a necessary 
feature of the world rather than saying anything informative—anything at all—about it. 
Schuman uses characteristics such as these to argue for “the validity in the outcome of 
K.’s case” (p. 47). Her tactic is to point to the previously identified contradictory “prem-
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ises,” and then to invoke ex falso quodibet. She claims that in this light, “we may call what 
has happened to [K.] fair, we may call it unfair, we may call it predestined, we may call it 
a shock—but… we may not call it illogical, nonsensical, or invalid” (p. 51). But her use 
of logic is murky:
After each contradiction, Kafka may put anything he wants, so long as 
it is grammatically put together in such a way that it belongs to the logical 
symbolism. And that thing, whether true or false, will be valid, because the 
only definition of logical validity is that it is invalid for all of the premises of an 
argument to be true but the conclusion false. (p. 50)
It is discouraging that at this point Schuman footnotes Barwise and Etchemendy’s text-
book Language, Proof and Logic specifically to refer to a section which explains the 
customary distinction between valid and sound arguments, as she seems to have been 
confused about some elementary points, such as that the validity of an argument is in-
dependent of the truth of its premises, or that a conclusion to an argument is true or 
false, a logically valid consequence of the argument’s premises (or not), but is not itself 
something that can be “valid” in the intended sense. Indeed, though Schuman repeatedly 
refers in general to some posited “argument” for purposes of discussion, she never speci-
fies one that K.’s judges might be applying to his case, or one that might be constructed 
from various statements about the law or the court on the level of jurisprudence. Perhaps 
thinking of one might have raised the question of the need to reason from the contradic-
tory premises in the first place. She is focused only on the idea that ex falso quodlibet is a 
valid rule of logical inference. And, seeming to suppose this would be the only relevant 
rule given the mess of contradictory premises she assigns to whomever is doing the rea-
soning, she embraces what she takes to be the conclusion. But as her source Barwise and 
Etchemendy notes, “An argument with inconsistent premises is always valid, but more 
importantly, always unsound” (p. 141). Perhaps she was caught on the first half of that 
remark. Barwise and Etchemendy also note, a few lines above it, “There is no reason to 
be convinced of the conclusion of an unsound argument.”
So the sort of argument Schuman wishes to make is clear enough. I think it is worth not-
ing, though, how far she is from being able to make it in the first place—a matter of the 
applicability of Wittgenstein’s ideas. I noted above that her case depends on identifying a 
number of contradictory story elements with tractarian contradictions. Indeed she more 
than once clearly wants to express these in a canonical form, P & –P, or in the form of a 
negation of a tautology, –(P v –P), as if to emphasize that what is at stake is solely a point 
of logical structure. But her “premises” (as recalled on p. 50) include:
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Josef K. is not guilty and not not guilty.
Victory and justice are the same thing.
An arrested person is also free.
An acquitted person is actually just pre-arrested.
Correctly understanding something and misunderstanding the same thing are 
not mutually exclusive.
Schuman obtains the first of these from a passage in the first chapter, “Arrest,” of The Tri-
al (I refer in what follows to the Breon Mitchell translation [Schocken Books, 1998], pp. 
8–9). K. wants to see the arrest warrant, and identification papers from the guards Franz 
and Willem. One guard chews him out for this, concluding his little harangue by saying, 
“That’s the Law. What mistake could there be?” K. says he doesn’t know that law. Thus:
“All the worse for you,” said the guard. “It probably exists only in your heads,” 
said K.; he wanted to slip into his guards’ thoughts somehow and turn them 
to his own advantage or accustom himself to them. But the guard merely said 
dismissively: “You’ll feel it eventually.” Franz broke in and said: “You see, Willem, 
he admits that he doesn’t know the Law and yet he claims he’s innocent.” “You’re 
right there, but he can’t seem to understand anything.”
Schuman’s gloss on that last remark of Franz to Willem is: “To maintain innocence but 
not know the law that defines it is to be neither guilty nor not guilty” (p. 43). She is quick 
to formalize an expression of K.’s “state of affairs,” –G & – –G (her locutions suggest she 
treats G as a predicate applied to one individual, K., but all her expressions of the com-
plex proposition, and most of the things she has to say about it, treat it as belonging only 
to propositional logic), which she goes on to discuss in the context of a tractarian idea of 
contradictions and tautologies as saying nothing, uninformative, using natural-language 
examples such as “it is raining or not raining” which are roughly canonical in form.
If we’re going to play this game, though, then we have to note that what Schuman later 
calls “Franz’s assertion” is not, canonically, a contradiction. There is what Franz says 
(or maintains), and what K. says (or maintains). It’s Schuman who conjoins them. On 
what grounds? Given the way trials are ordinarily conducted, it seems that if anything, 
we would have grounds only to say G v –G, or –(G & –G). This captures the adversarial 
character of the claims being considered, a matter that Schuman seems, as if by fiat, to 
have resolved by accepting it as strictly unresolvable in the world of the novel. It seems 
that we have to read Schuman’s gloss, “To maintain innocence but not know the law that 
defines it is to be neither guilty nor not guilty” (p. 43), as a substantial interpretation 
proposed by her, not strictly of the things said by the characters, or of these together with 
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the situation K. finds himself in, but of the novel, the entire literary work. Or, better: of 
its world.
In the discussion leading up to her claim about the “validity” of K.’s fate, Schuman more 
than once invokes the idea that tractarian contradictions are part of the logical symbol-
ism (pp. 48, 49)—they belong to it as one of its possibilities. But for whatever reason, de-
spite a discussion of truth tables (pp. 48-50) and an earlier discussion of the ontology and 
semantics of the Tractatus (pp. 15-22), she does not check her interpretations regarding 
the contradictoriness of K.’s situation against the complementary point of tractarian doc-
trine, that a contradiction, forming—just like a tautology—a kind of limit of the world, 
says nothing about the world, i.e., says nothing about some contingent state of affairs 
involving objects belonging to it. But K. finds himself, at least for our purposes here, 
among just those objects. His own existence is one of many contingent states of affairs. 
We might say that these, and K. himself, are what Kafka’s novel says something about; 
and Schuman with him, in interpreting the novel. We might also venture that the novel 
accomplishes this by picturing a world. What Schuman does not seem to have resolved 
is how an interpreter is in a position to say that talking about a novel’s world necessar-
ily shares a logic with talking about the world; or to say how a seemingly contradictory 
contingent, novelistic world is to be reconciled with the actual world, about which con-
tradictions say nothing.
